Patent and antitrust policy are often presumed to be in conflict. As an important example, there is ongoing controversy about whether price discrimination by a patent holder is an illegal or socially undesirable exploitation of monopoly power. In this article. we show that no conflict exists in many price discrimination cases. Even ignoring the (dynamic) effects on incentives for innovation, third-degree price discrimination by patent holders can raise (static) social welfare. In fact, Pareto improvements may well occur. Welfare gains occur because price discrimination allows patent holders: (a) to open new markets and (b) to achieve economies of scale or learning. Further, even in cases where discrimination incurs static welfare losses, it may be efficient relative to other mechanisms, such as length of patent life, for rewarding innovators with profits.
INTRODUCTION
A patent grant establishes a lawful monopoly, with exclusive rights to "make, use or vend" the patented good or process during the life of the patent. U.S. courts, however, have viewed the patent grant as a franchise, or privilege "conditioned by a public purpose". 1 Through case law, the courts have circumscribed the ways in which patentees may "use or vend" their patented innovations. Price discrimination is one practice that has been repeatedly challenged. 2 Economic analyses of price discrimination emphasize two issues: (1) price discrimination raises the patentee's profitability, which is the purpose of the patent grant; and, (2) price discrimination misallocates resources among purchasers, causing a decrease in social welfare. 3 Customers facing different prices will have different marginal valuations for the patented good, so that some loss in consumer welfare-relative to a first-best world-is inevitable. On the other hand, increasing the expected reward by allowing price discrimination should increase innovative effort, which presumably benefits society. Given the existing patent laws (which have their genesis in the Constitution), we must presume that monopoly rewards to inventors have some social desirability.
An optimal social policy for patents and monopoly will maximize the net social benefit of encouraging innovation while incurring monopoly misallocations. The case law can be viewed as a series of attempts to find the boundaries of the optimal tradeoff. For a particular behavior such as price discrimination, the question is whether the incremental We thank Oliver Hart, Steve Salop, Dick Schmalensee, Steve Salant, and Jean Tirole for helpful discussions, and three anonymous referees for useful comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Center for Energy Policy Research of the MIT Energy Laboratory.
gains from discrimination exceed the allocation costs incurred. 4 The balancing test is a difficult one to implement. There is almost no agreement on how much investment is induced and what the resulting social payoff is from an increase in expected profit. Further, the courts deal with one case at a time, but an optimal policy should be based on the benefits and costs for all innovative effort. 5 In this article, we show that the difficult balancing of incentives and allocation costs may not be necessary. The tradeoff can be viewed as one between dynamic welfare benefits (innovation incentives) and static welfare effects. We find, however, that the static effect will in many cases be beneficial, so that no tradeoff exists. If the cases in which both static and dynamic effects are beneficial are numerous or important enough, then optimal policy should allow discrimination.
It is well known that discrimination may raise static welfare in some cases, but certain characteristics that are typical of new innovations have been ignored. Price discrimination can provide opportunities to serve new markets and to achieve scale and learning economies, both of which are important for many patented innovations. 6 Opening markets and achieving scale economies increase static welfare, thereby increasing the likelihood that price discrimination for patented goods will yield static welfare gains.
We demonstrate that patentee price discrimination can be Pareto improving under some circumstances. This is a strong result, since Pareto improvements can occur without even counting the benefits of increasing innovation incentives. The rarity of Pareto improvements in applied settings emphasizes the importance of new markets and scale economies when analyzing the intersection of patent and monopoly policy.
In addition to the marginal social efficiency of allowing price discrimination, ceteris paribus, there are interesting questions about the optimal mix of different patent characteristics. Optimal policy will employ the least-cost means of providing a given reward to innovators. For any given level of patent reward, some amount of price discrimination yields higher welfare than uniform pricing. Thus, even if innovators receive sufficient rewards without price discrimination, an appropriate policy may be to allow discrimination, while, say, reducing the life of a patent.
In the next section we will consider the role of new markets in the welfare analysis of price discrimination; Section 3 will consider scale or learning economies. Then we will present as an example some facts from a recent patent case involving Du Pont's aramid fiber, KevlarG. Aramid fiber is precisely the sort of major new innovation that most economists believe patent policy is intended to encourage. 7 In Section 5 we investigate the relative efficiency of price discrimination as one instrument for providing rewards to innovators. Our conclusions are summarized in Section 6.
OPENING MARKETS WITH PRICE DISCRIMINATION
We first briefly review the known results on the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination. Schmalensee (1981) and Varian (1985) have formalized and extended the basic results, which are originally due to Robinson (1933) .
With fairly general assumptions it can be shown that, aside from any incentive externalities, a necessary (not sufficient) condition for price discrimination to increase static Marshallian welfare (the sum of consumers' and producer's surpluses) is that total output of the product increase. The intuition is straightforward. If different customers are paying different prices for a product, their marginal valuations are driven apart. Thus, price discrimination necessarily leads to allocative inefficiencies. For welfare to increase, total output must increase sufficiently for the resulting surplus gains to exceed the allocative losses.
Since output increases are not sufficient for welfare increases, it is usually necessary to analyze the specifics of each case. Schmalensee (1981) identifies some extreme cases for which there are definite welfare predictions. Varian (1985) derives bounds on the static welfare effect of discrimination, but general conclusions on the sign of the change are not possible.
The results above assume that all markets have positive demand under both price discrimination and uniform pricing. This assumption may often fail to hold. Suppose marginal cost is constant at c; introduce discrimination. The patentee sets marginal revenue equal to c in each market. This yields pm in market #1 again, and some price pm in market #2. Consumer welfare in market #1 is unchanged, consumer surplus in market #2 has increased, and the patentee obtains higher profits, thereby establishing a Pareto improvement. Now let marginal cost be decreasing. Consider charging (pm, p2 ) under discrimination. Total output is unambiguously greater than under uniform pricing (pm, p'), so that marginal cost is lower. Thus, to reach the profit maximizing point (MR = MC), output in each market must be increased and price lowered below (pm, p ). There is a strict Pareto improvement with all customers (in both markets) and the patentee better off. I Figure 1 illustrates the proposition with two linear demand curves. At the joint demand when price is the reservation price for market #2 (p), marginal cost exceeds joint marginal revenue, so that the second market is excluded by the optimal uniform price, p'. With discrimination, market #1 pays pm, and market #2 pays p2.
When more than one market is served under uniform pricing, the price depends on an appropriately weighted average of demand elasticities. When discriminatory prices are introduced, some prices may rise while others fall, which violates the conditions for a Pareto improvement. But aggregate Marshallian welfare may increase. We restate a result from Schmalensee (1981) 
Pareto Improvements with Scale Economies: No New Markets
We now demonstrate thatin the presence of scale economies, price discrimination can be Pareto improving even without new markets opening.l4 Let Q be the total output, C(Q) total cost, pi the price to the ith market, and ri the demand elasticity in market i.
Definition. The virtual elasticity, r/*(p) is the price elasticity of demand that necessarily obtains if price p is the monopoly pro t-maximizing price for the market of interest; i.e., 77*(p) solves p-C'(Q) 1 P 7r
Definition. The uniform price, p, is the profit maximizing price when all markets are charged the same price.
Definition. The uniform-price profit function, II(p), is the profit earned if the monopolist charges the same price to all markets,
Definition. The maximal discriminatory price, jp, is the max{p}N=l , where there are N possible markets, and p is the price charged to the ith market by a profitmaximizing third-degree price discriminator.
Proposition 4. If there are two or more demand curves for a product, if marginal cost is decreasing in total output, and the uniform price profit function is monotonic in the closed
interval [,pU] , and if
(where si is the output share of the ith market, qi/ C qi), then price discrimination will (weakly) yield a Pareto welfare improvement over uniform pricing.
Proof. We shall show that condition (1) implies pU > p, which implies that under price discrimination, the price to every market (weakly) falls. Let 7r (p,... ,p N) 
The result will be proven if we can show that (1) is a sufficient condition for (2) Differentiating (2) yields (1
Rewriting (4),
by the definition of the implicit elasticity, * ( p).
Now sum equations (5):
After rearrangement, we find that condition (3) is satisfied if and only if
i=l Thus, (7) is a sufficient condition for a Pareto improvement, given the other assumptions of the Proposition. 15 I Remark 1. The proposition has the following intuition. For a Pareto improvement to occur, the discriminatory price in each market must be lower than the uniform price, for which it is sufficient to establish that the uniform price is greater than the maximal discriminatory price (p). To show that p > p, we need to show that uniform-pricing marginal profit is positive at -, so that a profit-maximizing firm would set a uniform price above . Equation (7) provides a sufficient condition for this requirement. (Of course, there may be a welfare increase even if a Pareto improvement is not achieved.) 16 Condition (1) is equivalent to marginal profit being nonnegative at a uniform price of
5.
The left side of the condition is the aggregate demand elasticity that must obtain if 5 is the optimal uniform price. The right side is an expression for the actual elasticity of demand at p, E srl7 = (dQ/dp)(p/Q). Thus, the condition is that if the actual demand elasticity at is too low for to be the uniform price, the uniform price must be higher than (since demand elasticities are negative, 77* < ZE sii means the right-hand side is lower in absolute value). This is related to the monopoly pricing rule: raise price until demand becomes elastic enough that no further profit gains are possible.
Remark 2. We use a numerical example to demonstrate below that condition (1) is feasible. In fact, the example demonstrates that Pareto improvements can occur under a wider variety of conditions than those in Proposition 4.
Remark 3. It is not obvious from condition (1) why scale economies are necessary to get a Pareto improvement. To see that they are, consider the following illustration of how a Pareto improvement can occur. Suppose there are two markets: one is relatively inelastic and profitable under discriminatory pricing, the other is relatively elastic and not very profitable. It is intuitively clear that the optimal uniform price will be set near the monopoly price for the first, inelastic market; this sacrifices the small profits in the second market for the greater profits in the first. At that relatively high uniform price, demand in the elastic, second market is relatively low, so that total output is low and marginal cost is high.
Now let the firm discriminate. The price to the elastic market is dropped substantially, eliciting a big increase in output. With scale economies, marginal cost falls. To a first-order approximation, the uniform price was already profit maximizing for the inelastic market, so that all else equal the discriminatory price will not be much higher. But the elastic market has a "flywheel" effect, driving marginal cost down through a large output increase and thus moving the MR = MC profit-maximizing equilibrium price in the inelastic market lower than the uniform price, by moving down the MR curve to reach the new, lower
MC. 17
Using the first-order condition approach of Proposition 4, it is easy to demonstrate the necessity of declining marginal cost if we assume that, given a vector of prices in the other markets, profits in each market are single-peaked. (Global concavity of the joint profit function is sufficient to ensure this.) Let market 1 be the market with the maximal discriminatory price, price, p = . For markets i = 2,..., N, marginal profit at a uniform price of f (equation (4)) is negative because by definition p is above the profit-maximizing price, p,, for these markets. Then, for (3) to hold, it must be that r l( p,... ,p) is positive, since all other terms in the sum are negative. Use the price-discrimination first-order condition for market 1,
to substitute into condition (4) for i = 1, and obtain, 7rl(P,... ,P) = 71(P,P ,.
From (8), the first term on the right of (9) is zero from. The second term is positive if and only if marginal cost is decreasing, because total output is greater at {p? } than at .
Thus, decreasing marginal costs are necessary for the result to hold.
In fact, to satisfy equation (1) 
Numerical Example
In Proposition 4 we derived sufficient conditions for a Pareto improvement when the uniform price profit function is monotonic on [p,pU] . We now present an example that violates the monotonicity condition of Proposition 4, in order to demonstrate that welfare Under uniform pricing, the patent holder builds Plant X and charges a price of $42.97.
If the patentee can price discriminate, Plant Y will be more profitable, and the optimal prices will be pi = $21.67 to market #1 and p2 = $6.25 to market #2. The incremental profits from opening a new market under uniform pricing may not provide sufficient incentive to sink the necessary opening costs; the market-specific profit gains from price discrimination could make these incremental investments more attractive.
There are several costs of finding new uses for an innovation. First, the product or process may not be well understood; new properties, or new combinations of properties, can make surprising applications possible. In the case of KevlarO, strength-related uses (such as in bullet-resistant vests and tire belts) were obvious from the first, but the use of pulped aramid fiber in friction/sealer products was discovered only several years later, after considerable research. New uses may require further research and development to modify the properties of the product or to learn how to combine its properties with other goods. 2 3 Some important applications of KevlarO in the tire and mechanical rubber goods industry took more than ten years to emerge. 24 The costs of adopting a new innovation can also be important. Production processes often involve a complex series of stages, each calibrated to the specific characteristics of the raw materials to maximize productive efficiency. In many instances, machines a.re' specifically designed to work with a particular combination of inputs. When new inputs are considered, a "proving out" process is necessary, during which the performance of the new material is tested and production runs are redesigned to re-optimize the overall process.
Adoption of Kevlar( has been slowed in several markets by the "proving out" process, sometimes by as much as two years or more. For example, some tire manufacturers have switched from steel or fiberglass to Kevlar for high-performance tires. The properties, working requirements, and handling characteristics are remarkably dissimilar for inputs that ultimately serve similar ends. Likewise, in aircraft fuselage applications, very detailed testing, design, and performance specification is required to evaluate and choose among aramid fibers, graphite composites, fiberglass, and various plastics. 25 Plant scale economies and learning curve effects are also often important, especially in the chemical and materials industries. For instance, Lieberman (1984) has found that typical learning economies yield a 78% decrease in marginal costs for each doubling of output. Learning curve calculations for Kevlar© indicated that unit costs fell by some GO6%
for each doubling in cumulative output during the first ten or twelve years of production.
Scale economies are also a major phenomenon in chemical and related industries. 2 6
Since obtaining the aramid fiber patents, Du Pont built a series of three successively larger plants for the spinning of KevlarO. The first two were called "market development facilities," the first of which was gradually retired as the next plant in the series came on line. The last plant produces at substantially lower unit cost. Du Pont also achieved a very large one-time drop in unit costs by building a new, larger raw materials plant. 2 7
EFFICIENT PROVISION OF THE REWARDS TO INNOVATION
Even if price discrimination sometimes incurs net static welfare losses, policy discussions should be concerned with how the efficiency of the trade-off between innovation incentives and static welfare losses. For instance, patent rewards could be decreased either by shortening the life of patents, or by disallowing price discrimination. iWhat is the n-lo)st efficient pricing scheme the patentee can employ to obtain a given level of profit? The problem is that of Ramsey pricing, which is most often applied to analyze the regulation of natural monopolies. 28 The solution when demands are independent is to charge different prices to different groups of customers, with prices inversely proportional to the demand elasticity. 2 9 If there is no minimum profit, price should equal marginal cost in each market.
To maximize the patentee's profit, however, the optimal prices are precisely those that l unconstrained third-degree price discriminator would charge.
Some amount of price discrimination thus appears to be an efficient way to provide an innovator with a profit reward. Even if discrimination does not always yield the static welfare gains discussed earlier, it might be more efficient, for example, to let the patentee earn $20 a year for five years with discrimination rather than $12 a year for a ten-year patent life with uniform pricing. Allowing patentees to price discriminate increases the Marshallian efficiency of the patent system. For instance, with derived demand elasticities of 771 = -0.75 in market #1, and 72 = -2.0 in market #2, the optimal patent life with discrimination is 12 years, while with uniform pricing, T* = 22 years. 3 2 The optimal life with price discrimination is not shortened to reduce increased static monopoly costs. Rather, with price discrimination, the net present value index of social welfare is higher than with uniform pricing. In the case just mentioned, price discrimination achieves about 72% of the first-best welfare level while uniform pricing achieves only 44% of that level. These results hold across a wide range of price elasticities.
CONCLUSION
The casual notion that third-degree price discrimination is good for the monopolist but bad for the public is not true as a general proposition. We have discussed reasons why it may be even less likely that the proposition is true when the monopolist has obtaincd dominant power through a valid patent on an innovation. We have shown that not only may price discrimination by a patentee often increase Marshallian welfare but that it could even lead to Pareto welfare improvements.
Two special circumstances associated with patented innovations are important for the welfare effects of price discrimination. First, patented innovations for which discrimination is feasible are often intermediate inputs with applications in widely differing markets. 1With
uniform pricing, some markets may not be served (because, say, a competitive substitute is priced lower than the patented good's uniform price) and thus total output of the patented good and welfare may be lower.
Further, and quite importantly for a new product, declining marginal costs from scale and learning economies may be possible with increasing output. If discrimination opens new markets, such economies can increase the welfare gains. Scale economies also make it more likely that new markets will open with discrimination, thereby leading to welfare gains. And, price discrimination with scale economies can yield Pareto improvements in multiple market situations, when new markets alone cannot.
Finally, we have shown that some price discrimination is a relatively efficient way to obtain a given level of profit. The profits a patentee would earn with uniform pricing could also be earned with discriminatory prices and less static welfare loss. Thus, an optimal policy that trades off monopoly costs against the incentive effects of the patent reward should not disallow all discrimination.
In many legal cases, the fact of discrimination has not been found to be a patent misuse, but the practices used by the patentee to implement the pricing schedule have sometimes been judged to be monopolistic misuses of the patent grant. Implementation If discrimination is expected to be socially desirable overall, it makes little sense to proscribe otherwise harmless means of implementing discrimination. In fact, by ruling out certain implementation schemes, the courts may lead patent holders to devise more costly methods for discriminating, thus dissipating some of the surplus and reducing welfare gains. 3 5 Using vertical restraint doctrine to prevent third-degree price discrimination may be socially unproductive. '~T*" is the optimal patent life.
"Indcz" is the ratio of obtained social welfare to the first-best. '"71 " is the final demand elasticity in market #1.
Notes: The final demand elasticity in market #2 (r2) is 2.00. The social discount rate is 2,%. Te elasticity of the innovation production function with respect to investment is 0.1. The pre-innovation cost in market #1 is 1.5 times as great as in market #2. See Appendix 2 for further details and the derivation of the calculations. Neale and Goyder (1980) , p. 289.
2. We consider only third-degree discrimination and use "price discrimination" as an economic term of art, as defined in, say Pigou (1920) . Legal usage may sometimes differ.
3. Bowman (1973) believes discrimination should be encouraged because the net loss in allocative efficiency is small, while the gain in innovation incentives from higher profitability is significant (see, e.g., p. 56, p. 112) . Sullivan (1977) opposes discrimination (at least sometimes) because no socially desirable gain is obtained by increasing the patentee's profits (cx post ), while the costs to consumers can be high. Baxter (1966) has opposed patentee price discrimination because of inefficiencies caused by charging different consumers different prices. See also Kaplow (1984). 4. This marginalist approach embodies certain assumptions about continuity and concavity of the social welfare function; more generally, the resulting policy should be examined as a whole for its global optimality.
5. In particular, the ex post difference between measuring the benefits of a particular innovation and the monopoly costs created by that patent holder is not the right balanqe to check. The ex ante expected social benefits should be equal to the social costs for the marginal innovative effort, not for each project.
6. Of course, opening new markets and scale or learning economies are not limited to the production of patented innovations. The results in this paper apply generally to other instances in which price discrimination can occur. We think the circumstances will most often arise for patents, because patents may establish the necessary monopoly power for price discrimination to take place, and because we expect new markets and scale economies to be more important for new innovations than for "mature" products.
7. See, e.g., Scherer (1980) . 8. Throughout, when we say a demand function exists, we mean that there is positive demand at a price exceeding marginal cost. 9. Nonsubstitutability is a "non-envy" requirement for consumer utility. In the case of derived demands for an innovation by downstream producers of different products, we require that a lower input price to industry B not lower profits in industry A. The nonsubstitutability condition means that our proposition holds both for independent demands, such as those considered by Schmalensee (1981) , and for interdependent demands that are complementary.
10. Schmalensee assumed marginal cost was constant, but the argument for decreasing marginal cost follows directly from his results and our proof of Proposition 1. For a Marshallian welfare increase, a total output increase is necessary; if marginal cost is decreasing, then necessarily all equilibrium prices will be lower than if cost is constant when output increases. Schmalensee also assumed demands are independent, but Varian (1985) extends the result to interdependent demands.
11. If there is constant marginal cost, the uniform price cannot be above all discriminatory prices: lowering it to the highest discriminatory price would raise profits from all markets.
Lowering the uniform price a little further loses no profit in the highest-priced market, but increases profits elsewhere.
12. See, e.g., Schmalensee (1981) , Scherer (1980) . These authors observe that, a priori, the demand curve convexity conditions for a welfare improvement are no less likely than the conditions required for a welfare decrease.
13. The expectation of learning effects is another reason that initial plants may be undersized; thus learning effects can reinforce conventional plant economies. For simplicity, we do not model the dynamics of investment and output, so that we cannot formally treat learning effects. See, e.g., Spence (1981) . It can be shown, however, that our results generalize to learning economies since, as Spence has shown, learning economies can be formally described as a decreasing shadow marginal cost.
14. Proposition 4 will state a sufficient condition for Pareto improvement. A numerical example later will demonstrate that the condition is feasible. For simplicity, we assume in the analysis that scale economies follow from declining marginal cost, although in the example, economies are of the plant scale variety.
15. Equation (6) requires that L(p) be nonzero. Since a uniform-pricing monopolist sets marginal revenue of the joint demand curve equal to marginal cost, L(p) can be zero only if the uniform-pricing aggregate demand is zero (P = MR), in which case a weak Pareto improvement from price discrimination follows immediately.
16. We require local monotonicity here so that we can rely on the first-order conditions. Monotonicity in profits is not necessary for a Pareto improvement, however, as we show by our example below.
17. Note that scale economics generalize the results about Pareto improvements derived from opening new markets that were described in the previous section. The "flywheel" narket is more-or-less "closed" at the uniform price but "opens" with discrimination.
Introducing scale economies, however, makes Pareto improvements possible with more than two markets; with constant costs, Pareto improvements could only occur in the special two-market case.
18. We are not recommending that a finding of a Pareto, or even a Marshallian, welfare gain should be necessary for the permissibility of price discrimination in specific cases.
Spillovers from the effect of profits on future innovative efforts by all firms also need to be taken into account in a general evaluation. and other] end-uses took at least five and usually closer to ten years before commercial sales were achieved."
26. Lieberman (1984) estimates an 11% reduction in marginal costs as plant scale is doubled. Scherer (1980) discusses such economies and has numerous references to empirical validation.
27. The Pontchartrain plant, which produces the raw materials for KevlarO, has a capacity nearly double the level of demand at the time it was built. The new Spruance spinning facility has twice the output rate of the prior facility.
28. Ramsey (1927) . The result was developed for publicly-controlled natural monopolies by Boiteux (1971) .
29. A qualitatively similar condition holds for non-independent demands.
30. These hypothetical numbers assume a discount rate of about 10%.
31. The assumptions and model used to generate the results are summarized in an appendix that is available from the authors.
32. Derived demand elasticities less than unity (e.g., r7 1 = -0.75) are not inconsistent with monopoly profit maximization in this setting. The "upward" elasticity (i.e., the demanlld elasticity if price is raised) of the derived demand curve facing the monopolist will be greater than unity, as usual. In fact, in the single demand curve case studied by Nordhaus, the derived demand upward elasticity is infinite for "run-of-the-mill" innovations, regardless of the final demand elasticity. If the price of the patented good is raised a little, final good producers will switch all demand to the competing substitute, even if the final demand they face has elasticity less than unity.
33. Third-degree discrimination is not feasible unless arbitrage across markets is prevented.
Patent holders frequently impose conditions on sales intended to prevent such arbitrage.
34. In this case, the argument was unsuccessful. See Akzo N.V. vs. USITC, 808 Fed 2d 1471 , 1488 -89 (Fed. Circ. 1986 ), cert. denied, US 1987 35. Williamson (1979) is concerned with the reduction in the gains from discrimination due to transaction costs of implementation.
